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	The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is a novel, infrequently studied node in the EU’s system of governance.  Established by the Maastricht Treaty, the CoR was designed to recognize the voice of regional and local authorities in the Union’s policy-making process.  In addition to embodying the Union’s commitment to subsidiarity, the CoR was meant to address the democratic deficit by offering representatives of sub-national bodies a formal place on the EU’s policy-making stage.
	Scholars debated the practical and theoretical implications of the Committee in the years immediately following its establishment.​[1]​  They wondered, among other things, whether the CoR could overcome the diversity of its membership, whether it could establish an effective niche within the EU’s decision-making system, whether it could truly help to overcome the democratic deficit, and whether sub-national authorities across the EU would appreciate the body as an effective channel of representation.  After ten years of CoR activity and in the wake of 2004’s historic enlargement, the moment is fortuitous to address some of these questions anew.
	This paper briefly analyzes the first decade of CoR activity and pays particular attention to the possible effects of enlargement on the Committee’s modus operandi.  What role has the Committee struck for itself within the EU’s policy-making game?  Has it succumbed to the bickering and immobility that some early analysts predicted?  How will enlargement affect the CoR’s emerging position within EU politics?  Will it reinforce, detract from, or otherwise transform the CoR’s roles?  Might it bury the CoR in acrimony and (further) discredit the body in the eyes of the Union’s more powerful and established institutions?  The paper attempts to throw light on these questions.  
On first glance, enlargement might appear to be a dark prospect indeed.  At its first post-enlargement plenary session, the Committee’s membership expanded from 222 to 317 members (an increase of almost 43%).  The influx of new members and alternates might pose an administrative challenge to a body already riddled with such challenges.  The overwhelming majority of new members, furthermore, come from states with weak traditions of sub-national self-government.  Territorial reforms in many central and east European states have been completed only recently, and representatives of local and (especially) regional self-governments are still adjusting to their new roles.  What is more, sub-national authorities from acceding states have high expectations of the Community’s regional policy.  Demands from members from these states could incapacitate the CoR by fueling feuds (a) between new members and members from states that benefited most from the funds before enlargement, and (b) between these two groups and recalcitrant net contributors to the EU’s regional-policy budget.  Enlargement, in short, could shock the CoR administratively, culturally, constitutionally, and politically.  It could upset the delicate balances that have emerged within the Committee over its first decade and derail a body that is still struggling, particularly in the wake of a recent funding scandals and allegations of fraud, to justify its role within the Union. 
	This paper accepts these challenges as real but argues that enlargement is not likely to stunt the CoR’s growth or to upset the balances reached within the Committee over the course of its first ten years.  Drawing from quantitative and qualitative data, I argue that enlargement will not fundamentally threaten the CoR’s emergent position and operating procedures.  Specifically, it will not derail partisan and authority-based balances and quasi-consociational decision-making procedures that have anchored the Committee and facilitated its gradual movement towards increased voice within the EU.  The paper begins by chronicling salient institutional developments of the Committee’s first decade.  It then examines the demographic and organizational effects of enlargement and suggests that these effects are unlikely to derail the balances discussed in the first section.  It concludes with a broader discussion of the likely trajectories of the Committee and the role of sub-national authorities within EU politics beyond 2004.

The CoR’s first decade: internal compromises and the pursuit of external influence

	A comprehensive account of the CoR’s development is beyond this paper’s scope.​[2]​  This section simply summarizes the major challenges the body has faced, the rules and compromises that CoR leaders have designed to confront these challenges, and the successive attempts made by the Committee to overcome its marginal position within the EU system.  It places special emphasis on CoR party groups, stressing the role that party groups have played in mitigating centrifugal tendencies, promoting consensus, and facilitating coordination with actors in other EU institutions.
	The Committee got off to a rocky start, as it was granted a weak legal position in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).  Strong sub-national actors (i.e., German Länder, Belgian regions and communities, and Spanish autonomous communities), pan-European organizations (especially the Assembly of European Regions and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions), the European Commission, and governments from member states with strong regions pushed for the establishment of the Committee during the IGC on political union that preceded the signature of the TEU.  Due to resistance from some member states, though, the body that was eventually constructed was weaker than the one these advocates proposed.​[3]​  
Article 198c of TEU required the Commission and the Council to consult the CoR in a relatively circumscribed set of policy areas—“education, youth and vocational training, public health, trans-European networks, economic and social cohesion, and certain aspects of the structural funds.”​[4]​  It allowed the CoR to issue own-initiative opinions “where it consider[ed] that specific regional interests [we]re involved,”​[5]​ but did not require the institutional “targets” of CoR opinions to incorporate or formally respond to them.  TEU also required the Council to review the Committee’s procedural rules before they became effective, left the CoR dependent on the budgetary decisions of other EU actors, and obliged the body to share administrative services with the Economic and Social Committee.  It further stipulated that the Committee consist of 189 “representatives of regional and local bodies” and an equal number of alternates.​[6]​ The Committee would not be an EU “institution,” but a mere “body (it was established under Article 4.2 rather Article 4.1 TEU) and would lack the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice if/when it felt legally slighted.  These legal foundations implied formidable hurdles as the CoR sprang to life in 1994. 
	Reinforcing these legal handicaps are challenges that inhere in the extraordinary diversity of the CoR’s membership.  Sub-national authorities in Europe occupy remarkably different positions in their countries’ respective constitutional orders.​[7]​  There are immense historical, social, economic, cultural, political, and administrative variations between, for example, the median German Land, the median French region, the median Italian region, and the median Irish county.  Some member states are unambiguously federal (i.e., Germany, Belgium, Austria), others increasingly blur distinctions between federalism and unitary governance (i.e., Spain, Italy), and others are unambiguously unitary (i.e., Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg).  Some have multiple tiers of self-government between municipal and central-state levels (i.e., France, with departments and regions), while others (i.e., Luxembourg) have no intermediate levels at all.  What is more, the “Regions” in the Committee’s title is a loosely specified noun, encompassing intermediate levels; towns, cities, and other municipal authorities; overseas territories; and language communities.  Loughlin has stressed that the case could hardly be otherwise: any definition of “region” that restricted the term to supra-municipal territorial authorities would, at the time of the CoR’s establishment, have denied representation to countries that lacked “higher” self-governing bodies, including the United Kingdom.​[8]​  
The “territorial diversity” of the CoR led some early observers to expect the body to become paralyzed by discord.​[9]​  It was particularly feared that the differing perspectives of local and regional representatives would make it impossible to reach consensus and to overcome the Committee’s weak constitutional starting point.    Formidable as the authority-based cleavage was, it was not the only potential challenge to the body’s coherence.  Christiansen, for example, discussed four other possible cleavages.​[10]​  He wondered, for example, whether a left-right political divide might polarize the Committee.  He also suggested that the Committee could become an arena of urban/industrial vs. rural conflict; of conflict between representatives of “executive regionalism” and “deliberative regionalism;” and of disagreement among member-state delegations.  Were any of these potential cleavages to beset the Committee, the body would have a difficult time gaining credibility, taking advantage of opportunities for influence, and digging its way out of its peripheral legal position.
Has the CoR managed to combat these centrifugal pressures during its first decade?  It would be inaccurate to claim that the CoR has overcome them entirely. Each cleavage has made at least an occasional appearance, but none has so utterly gripped the body as to decisively threaten its coherence.  This has largely been due to the efforts of CoR members themselves.  The first generation of CoR leaders recognized and took steps to reconcile potentially competing interests.  The body’s first president—Jacques Blanc, the head of France’s Languedoc-Roussillon region—was the target, during his tenure, of sharp criticism from both within and outside the Committee.  Still, an early deal struck by Blanc and Barcelona’s mayor, Pasqual Maragall i Mira, helped to manage both partisan and local-regional splits.  Blanc was a member of the center-right UDF, chair of the AER, and representative of a “higher-level” authority.  Maragall, a Spanish Socialist, chair of the CEMR, and municipal leader, was Blanc’s opposite number in each respect.  Prior to the CoR’s first meeting, the two leaders brokered a compromise:  Blanc would act as CoR president for the first two years of the Committee’s first session, and Maragall would serve as his first vice-president.  Blanc and Maragall would then swap positions at the end of the two years, with Maragall leading the body for the remainder of its first four-year mandate.  Though criticized for its opacity at the time of its consummation, the deal turned out to be a shrewd one.  It introduced in the Committee a consensual, quasi-consociational ethos that gave opposing sides a share in the leadership of the body.​[11]​ The pattern of alternating presidents has become informally institutionalized and has been followed since 1994.
	Since the first session, CoR members have also established strong party groups, which, far from pulling the Committee apart, have actually served an integrating function.  During the Committee’s first two years of operation, members and alternates established four party groups, which roughly corresponded to pre-existing groups in the European Parliament.  The Party of European Socialism (PES) and European People’s Party (EPP) crystallized almost immediately, and the PES-EPP quid pro quo was a central element of the Blanc-Maragall bargain.  Party groups meet before the CoR’s plenary sessions (which typically take place five times a year), and each group has established a permanent secretariat in Brussels.  In addition to encouraging coordination within the CoR, party-group organization has facilitated information sharing, coordination, and mutual understanding between CoR members and party-group counterparts in the European Parliament.  
	There are intuitive reasons to believe that the “partyization” of the CoR, by itself, would not threaten the body’s position or status.  PES and EPP have been closely matched in terms of membership in all three of the CoR’s mandates (1994-1998, 1998-2002, 2002-present). Before the 2004 enlargement, for example, 90 of 222 (40.5%) members belonged to the PES party group, 87 (39.2%) to the EPP group, 27 (12.2%) to the European Liberal Democrat and Reform (ELDR) group, and 9 (4.1%) to the European Alliance (EA) group.​[12]​  No party group has ever claimed a majority of the Committee’s seats.  This non-majoritarian distribution of membership has reinforced the consociational characteristics of the Committee; without a majority, no party group has been able to power through a partisan “agenda.”
	What is more, the Committee’s fluid membership and alternate system institutionalize uncertainty and make the proposal and survival of controversial opinions less likely. The mandates of individual Committee members are rarely as clear, for example, as the mandates claimed by national legislators.  The Nice Treaty stipulates that if a member or alternate loses his or her domestic mandate, he/she simultaneously loses her seat in the Committee.  It is therefore conceivable (a) that the seat of a disqualified member may be filled by a replacement who belongs to another party group, and (b) that the relevant member state will take its time proposing replacements for vacant seats.  Also, given the fact that members and alternates have significant responsibilities at home, the precise configuration of any plenary or commission session (i.e., “who shows up”) may not be clear until the day of the session.  These elements of uncertainty temper the potential for divisive partisanship, making it difficult for party leaders to count on the support of party-group colleagues and encouraging concessions to the multiple concerns represented in the Committee.
These tendencies notwithstanding, some have suggested that the Committee is becoming too politicized, that it is moving away from the consultative/advisory role to which it is best suited and towards a representational/political role that threatens to dilute its potential.  Christiansen, for example, bemoans the development of a “decidedly ‘representational’ self-perception” in the Committee.​[13]​  He interprets the increasing importance of party groups, the membership of high-profile politicians (i.e., Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Edmund Stoiber, and Jörg Haider), and the exclusion of sub-national bureaucrats as threats to the Committee’s ability to shape policy.
The argument that party-political organization has been a central theme of the Committee’s early development is uncontroversial, as is the theoretical threat to the body of “overpoliticization.”  To be effective, the CoR must walk a tightrope between “neutral” policy advice and “politicized” representation.  Nonetheless, evidence that the Committee has become too politicized is not overwhelming.  The data in Tables 1 and 2 suggest (a) that the development of strong party groups has not necessarily mitigated against consensus decision-making, and (b) that consensus decision-making in the Committee has actually become more frequent during the body’s most recent session (2002-present).
Interpretation of these data requires a brief review of the CoR’s opinion-adoption process.  As stated above, the impetus for an opinion may come from within the CoR or via referral from the European Commission, Council of Ministers, or Parliament.  After receiving a request for an opinion, the CoR’s Bureau refers the matter to a commission, whose chair chooses a rapporteur (or rapporteurs) from that commission to draft the opinion.  After discussion and amendment of the draft opinion in commission, the draft is forwarded to the CoR plenary, where debate is generally limited.  The plenary may adopt the opinion by unanimity or majority.  The Committee does not collect roll-call data but does record whether an opinion has been adopted by unanimity or (non-unanimous) majority consent.     

Table 1: Measures adopted by the CoR, March 1994 – February 2004







Sources:  “Towards Consolidation of the Committee of the Regions within the European Union” (CdR 188/96 fin); ”Update of Opinions Adopted by the Committee of the Regions (Chronological), 2nd four-year term of office (1998-2002)” (CdR 371/1998); “Update of Opinions Adopted by the Committee of the Regions (Chronological), 3rd four-year term of office (2002-2006);” author’s calculations.


As Table 1 demonstrates, the Committee plenary adopted by unanimity approximately 2/3 of the 617 matters on which it decided between March 1994 and February 2004.  Though there is no objective indicator of what constitutes “overpoliticization,” the data suggest that Christiansen’s concerns may be too pessimistic.  CoR members have taken pains to overcome divisions and reach unanimity, and their efforts have frequently paid off.  The data in Table 2 also suggest that after a relative spike in partisan opinions during the 1998-2002 session, the current Committee has moved towards more unanimity.  Three-quarters of its opinions and other decisions in the 2002-February 2004 period passed by unanimous consent.  This fact is important, especially given that the “no-voters” on majority opinions may base their opposition on reasons other than partisanship.  Detailed case studies of particular opinions would be necessary to determine the frequency of “partisan-based” dissent.  









Sources:  “Towards Consolidation of the Committee of the Regions within the European Union” (CdR 188/96 fin); ”Update of Opinions Adopted by the Committee of the Regions (Chronological), 2nd four-year term of office (1998-2002)” (CdR 371/1998); “Update of Opinions Adopted by the Committee of the Regions (Chronological), 3rd four-year term of office (2002-2006);” author’s calculations.

Regardless, it is clear that partisan divisions have not crippled the body and that unanimity voting has become more frequent in the current session (at least given the available data, which reach through February 2004).  The Committee’s two most recent presidents (Briton Sir Albert Bore of PES and German Peter Straub of EPP) have both actively encouraged the Committee to “speak with one voice.”​[14]​  Preliminary evidence suggests that their pleas have been effective.   In short, evidence on the Committee’s methods of opinion adoption seems to reinforce the body’s implicit inclination towards consensus.
All of these developments demonstrate the complex and multi-faceted development of the CoR over the course of its first decade.  On one hand, party-group organization has proceeded apace and has helped to channel and mitigate other potential cleavages, particularly the regional/local divide.  On the other hand, the ideological split has not overwhelmed the Committee, which has sustained a norm of consensus-based decision making despite occasional divisions based on authority, partisanship, geography, and national origin.  Disagreements have generally been limited to specific debates and have not become deeply entrenched.
The Committee’s relative success in managing its diversity has paid small but significant dividends.  This can be seen in numerous ways.  First, in terms of the Union’s everyday legislative process, analysts have found that CoR opinions have affected the shape of proposals introduced by the Commission and passed by the Council and/or Parliament.​[15]​  Granted, this influence is neither guaranteed nor easy to gauge; the Committee has influenced some draft legislation and failed to influence other drafts.​[16]​  Additionally, it remains difficult to determine the extent to which the Committee, its individual members, and/or other interested actors actually affect decisions to amend a legislative text.  Still, Warleigh draws from quite exhaustive research to conclude that the CoR is “something of a rising star.”​[17]​  It has proved capable, despite its formally peripheral status, of “shap[ing] agendas, provid[ing] ideas for policy change/innovation, and influenc[ing] the final shape of legislation.”​[18]​ 
The second, more easily gauged, indication that EU actors have extended slow but steady “rewards” to the CoR derives from analysis of the results of post-Maastricht treaty revisions.  In the preludes to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, and during the Convention on the Future of Europe, the Committee lobbied to increase its status within the EU system.  It has tried to convince the member states to redefine “subsidiarity” to include sub-national authorities, to give the CoR status as an EU-wide guardian of subsidiarity, to recognize the Committee as a full EU institution, and to grant the CoR a right to recourse at the ECJ.  These “large” demands went unmet at both Amsterdam and Nice.  Still, the Committee made incremental progress in both treaty revisions on other, more moderate demands.  The Amsterdam treaty, for example, ceded the CoR’s wish to have its administrative services decoupled from ECOSOC, gave the EP the right to consult the CoR, and extended the range of policy proposals on which the Committee must legally be consulted.  The Nice Treaty recognized the CoR’s demand that members and alternates be directly elected or accountable to elected sub-national authorities and lowered the bar for appointment from unanimity to a qualified majority vote in the Council.
The Constitutional Treaty also recognizes many of the CoR’s demands.  Though a comprehensive account of the Committee’s strategy and payoffs in the current constitutional project remains to be written, it is clear that Committee members managed: 
	to pass a unanimous opinion on CoR participation at the Convention 
	to gain approval for the inclusion of six CoR members as observers to the Convention 
	to have many of CoR’s most important demands met (i.e., the redefinition of subsidiarity, the recognition of territorial cohesion (in addition to social and economic cohesion) as a Union objective, and the right to take perceived breaches of subsidiarity to the ECJ), and 
	to maintain the gains included in the Convention’s draft throughout the process of intergovernmental bargaining    
	In sum, over the course of its first ten years, the CoR has overcome some of its formal handicaps, mitigated cleavages through the development of strong party groups, and yet avoided “overpoliticization.”  Though negative dimensions of the Committee’s development (i.e., excessive use of own-initiative opinions and the 2003 funding scandal) must not be ignored, Warleigh’s suggestion that the Committee has been “successful despite its shortcomings” remains credible.​[19]​  But will this qualified success continue after enlargement? 


Managing the challenges of enlargement

	This section attempts to answer this question via consideration of the demographic and sociological/cultural dimensions of the enlargement process.  In preparation for enlargement, the Nice Treaty capped the CoR’s membership at 350.  The distribution of seats among “old” member states has not be altered with enlargement; seats reserved for acceding states have been distributed “on top” of the pre-existing seats.  Ninety-five members and ninety-five alternates represent the ten states in the EU’s “class of 2004,” increasing the CoR’s membership from 222 to 317.  The Council formally appointed new members and alternates in its first meeting after enlargement (May 11, 2004), and the first session of the post-enlargement CoR took place in June 2004.  Member-state shares of the CoR’s seats are displayed in Table 3.

















Denmark	   9
Ireland	   9
Finland	   9
Lithuania	   9
Slovakia	   9
Estonia	   7
Latvia	   7
Slovenia	   7
Cyprus	   6
Luxembourg	   6
Malta	   5
TOTAL	317
Notes: States acceding to the Union in 2004 are indicated in italics.  Each state also appoints an identical complement of alternates.


    	Theoretically, the large infusion of new members could upset the delicate balances discussed above.  If members from accession states disproportionately represented regional (as opposed to local) authorities, for example, then fears about regional domination of the chamber might enjoy a kind of renaissance, and CoR’s leaders and members might be forced to forge a new modus vivendi between levels of authority.  Similarly, a disproportionate infusion of “leftists” or “rightists” could upset the relative partisan balance that has characterized each of the CoR’s terms to date.  Alternatively, party families that are better-represented in the sub-national legislatures of acceding states (particularly populists, post-communists, and independents) might form new party groups, thus interrupting the familiar coexistence among EPP, PES, ELDR/ALDE, and EA. The demographics of new CoR members, in short, could shock the CoR, forcing it to attend to internal organizational matters, potentially weakening its external face, and impeding its efforts to increase its voice in the policy process.  A glance at the figures suggests, however, that such a demographic shock is unlikely.
	Table 4 considers the impact of enlargement on the scope of representation in the CoR.  As van der Knapp has noted, “classifying regional and local levels is a complicated and deceptive venture,” precisely for the reasons discussed in the previous section.​[20]​  For these reasons, the data in Table 4 rely on a simple classification, coding representatives of municipal authorities with a “1” and representatives of all supra-municipal authorities (including highest sub-national authorities, intermediate sub-national authorities, language communities, and overseas territories) with a “0.”

Table 4: Representation of local and “supra-local” authorities in the CoR

Authority	CoR before enlargement (2004)	Accession states (2004)	CoR after enlargement (2004)




	At first glance, the figures are rather striking:  while approximately 2/3 of the CoR’s members before enlargement represented supra-local authorities, approximately 2/3 of CoR members from the accession states represent local authorities.  Some new member states (i.e., Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Latvia) lack an intermediate level of self-government.  In other new member states (i.e., Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), regional self-government is in its infancy.  In most “2004 states,” associations of municipalities have impressive, well-entrenched lobbies able to influence their respective governments’ decisions about whom to nominate to the CoR.  These facts notwithstanding, absorption of new members has not translated into local “control” of the Committee.  Currently (after enlargement), 55.5% of CoR members represent supra-municipal authorities, and 44.5% represent local authorities. 
	Since party groups have helped to channel and mitigate centrifugal pressures in the Committee over the course of its first ten years, it is important to investigate how enlargement has affected the body’s party-political composition.  In all, the 95 new members represent at least 37 national parties that stretch the expanse of their countries’ political spectra.  Party families represented among new-member delegates include:
	Post-communists (i.e., the Polish SLD and the Hungarian MSZP) 
	Secular liberal-conservatives (i.e., Estonian Reform Party, Hungarian Fidesz), 
	Social democrats (i.e., Czech Social Democrats, Lithuanian Social Democrats) 
	Christian democrats (i.e., Czech KDU-ČSL, Slovak KDH)
	Populists and nationalists (i.e., Slovak HZDS, ĽU, and SMER; Lithuanian Homeland Union)
	Independents   
It is remarkable, in light of this diversity, that the established party-group system in the CoR has absorbed the new members.  One cannot discount the possibility that new or “reconfigured” party groups will form in the future.  In the short-to-medium term, though, such change seems unlikely.  Over the course of its first eight post-enlargement months, there has been no significant movement toward reconfiguration.  New members have joined existing party groups rather than forming new groups.  

(View Table 5 here)


Table 5: Party group membership in the CoR 
Party group	CoR before enlargement (2004)	Accession states (2004)	CoR after enlargement (2004)
	# of members	% of members (out of 222)	# of members	% of members (out of 95)	# of members	% of members (out of 317)
Party of European Socialism (PES)	90	40.5	26	27.4	116	36.6
European People’s Party (EPP)	87	39.2	37	38.9	124	39.1
European Liberal Democrat and Reform (ELDR/ALDE)	27	12.2	18	18.9	45	14.2
European Alliance (EA, UEN-EA)	9	4.1	2	2.1	11	3.5
Unaffiliated	9	4.1	12	12.6	21	6.6

Table 5 presents data on the party-group implications of enlargement.  It is clear, first and foremost, that enlargement has presented something of a challenge for the Party of European Socialism, decreasing its total share of CoR seats from 40.5% to 36.6% and robbing PES of its status as the body’s plurality party group.  The European People’s Party seems to have benefited from enlargement, having wrested plurality status (with 39.1% of the seats) from PES.  This fact may turn out to be significant, coinciding as it does with Peter Straub’s recent assumption of the CoR presidency.  Nonetheless, the “good fortune” of the EPP must be qualified with at least three caveats.  The first, and most important, derives from the discussion in the previous section: because of the CoR’s peculiar constitutional position, plurality “control” does not confer the same benefits as plurality control of conventional legislatures.  Second, in relative terms, ELDR/ALDE and independents—not the EPP—are the biggest “net winners” of enlargement in the CoR.  Third, the EPP now includes members from national parties that have traditionally had quite lukewarm relations amongst themselves (i.e., ODS and KDU-ČSL from the Czech Republic; PO and PSL from Poland).  It remains to be seen whether these parties can reach accommodation in the CoR even as they continue to feud in domestic arenas.

Table 6:  Party group membership in the CoR, by sex 

Sex	CoR before enlargement (2004)	Accession states (2004)	CoR after enlargement (2004)




	Table 6 presents data on enlargement’s implications for the representation of the sexes.  A number of the Committee’s most respected and visible members are women; France’s Claude du Granrut and Finland’s Eva Riita-Siitonen, for example, represented the CoR at the Convention.  Still, no woman has ever served as CoR President or first vice-president, and the Committee has traditionally fallen significantly shy of equal sexual representation.  The gender imbalance has become even more skewed with enlargement.  Today, over 80% of the body’s members are men.  This development may not be surprising, given the political marginalization of women in most post-communist and Mediterranean contexts.​[21]​  Regardless, the issue of gender imbalance in the CoR, which has occasioned little theoretical or practical reflection to date, may turn out to be important.  While observers have debated the extent of the CoR’s policymaking role and the implications of its “partyization” for its future viability, they have generally agreed that the body fulfills an important symbolic function by giving voice to politicians who are “close to citizens” and breathing life into abstractions like “subsidiarity.”  What remains unclear is whether, when, and how skewed sexual representation might “catch up” with the Committee, effectively detracting from the Committee’s symbolic cachet. 
	Summary data suggest that the influx of new members has not fundamentally challenged the CoR’s modus operandi.​[22]​  But what of the more qualitative, cultural impacts of enlargement?  Might new members require significant time to get “up to speed” on the possibilities and limitations of the body?  Might their lack of experience (a) with democratic self-government, and (b) with the EU system slow the CoR down and decrease its standing vis-à-vis other EU institutions?  
Incumbent CoR members recognized the challenges inherent in these questions and attempted to address them in the years preceding enlargement.  In 1997, the Committee made its first contacts with sub-national authorities in applicant states. The authorities generally welcomed these contacts and called for deeper exchanges with the CoR.  In May 1998, the CoR responded, creating an ad-hoc group within its executive bureau.  This Liaison Group intensified the body’s contacts in the region and sponsored the Committee’s first resolution on the enlargement process, which passed in plenary on November 17, 1999.   In April 2000, the Group was reshaped, renamed, and put under new leadership.  The refurbished Liaison Group (and its chair, Lord Hanningfield) achieved quite a high profile in numerous applicant countries.​[23]​  The body was dissolved in 2002, though, at the beginning of the CoR’s current mandate.  At that point, the CoR’s enlargement-related activities were folded into the work of the commission for external relations (RELEX).
	The CoR’s approach to sub-national authorities in the applicant states was thus rather haphazard over time.  Nonetheless, SNAs used the CoR’s initiatives to deepen contacts with counterparts from existing member states.  In each candidate country, the Liaison Group cooperated with national associations of local and (where they existed) regional authorities to organize a national conference.  The conferences facilitated information sharing—CoR members would discuss the role of the Committee in the EU system and their experiences with EU policy making and implementation, and representatives from the candidate countries would discuss the status of territorial governance in their countries and the particular challenges of enlargement. 
After each conference, the Committee would invite a delegation of ten elected local and regional representatives to visit Brussels.  Once there, delegation members would attend CoR plenaries, meet with the Liaison Group, offer input to rapporteurs on draft opinions, meet with representatives from regional offices and lobby groups, and network with other Brussels-based organizations.  In July 2002, the Committee invited twelve representatives from the applicant states to address the CoR plenary, and in July 2003, observers from the accession states began to participate (on a regular basis) in most CoR business, including plenaries, commission sessions, and party-group meetings.  Each accession state was represented by the same number of observers as it would have members after accession.  Because the Treaty of Nice stipulated, for example, that Poland would have 21 members and 21 alternates, 21 observers and 21 alternate observers represented Polish sub-national authorities between 2003 and 2004. 
	In spite of the Committee’s ad-hoc approach, select individuals from the accession states had, by May 2004, become quite familiar with the CoR’s potential, procedures, and limitations.  Small groups of “CoR experts”—people with significant experience in and regular contacts with the CoR—emerged within each accession state.  Most individuals who had served as observers and alternate observers before enlargement have become full members and alternates after enlargement.  At its first post-enlargement plenary, 79 of the 95 (83.2%) members from new member states had previously served as observers or alternate observers (see Table 7).​[24]​

Table 7: Experience of CoR members from 2004 accession states













	Most CoR members from acceding states have “hit the ground running.”   There is some cross-country variation; in Poland and Lithuania, for example, only 61.9% and 44.4% of current CoR members served as CoR observers or alternates.  Contrast this with delegations from the smaller states—Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta—which are comprised entirely of individuals with pre-2004 experience.  Though this variation might suggest that members from larger states will be more difficult to “absorb” than members from the smaller states, it must be noted that CoR-accession state relationships before accession were not equally densely institutionalized.  Three accession states—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Cyprus—had established “joint consultative committees” (JCCs) with the CoR in the years before the CoR accepted accession-state observers.  These committees met periodically to discuss issues similar to those covered by the conferences and served as an alternative venue for network formation and acclimation to the EU system.  




	This paper has suggested that in its first ten years, the Committee of the Regions has done an admirable job of managing centrifugal tendencies and developing an effective niche within the EU political system.  It has carved this niche by balancing its consultative and representational roles through a consensus-based, quasi-consociational ethos that is anchored in its unique constitutional position and reinforced through the party-group system.  It has also suggested that enlargement is unlikely to upset the CoR’s developmental course or to bury the body in internal organizational chaos.
What do these suggestions imply for the future of the CoR?  The Committee has made slow and steady progress in every treaty revision since TEU.  The Constitutional Treaty confirms the CoR’s status as a “body” and fails to recognize it as an “institution.”  Still, most CoR members have supported the outcomes of the Convention and the IGC.​[25]​  They have endorsed the final version of the Treaty and urged the EP and ratifying authorities in the member states (representative bodies and electorates) to approve it.  In addition to its specific advisory function in the Union’s legislative process, the Committee has also recently taken on the roles of coordinator and participant in a strategic “structured dialogue” between high levels of the Commission (presidents Prodi and Barroso have both participated) and local and regional authorities.  All of these developments suggest that the Committee is carving a distinct niche for itself within EU politics, a point of view echoed by almost all current heads of state and government, EP president Josep Borell, former Commission President Jacques Delors, and other luminaries who contributed to the Committee’s tenth-anniversary celebration, which took place during the November 2004 plenary.​[26]​  
Enlargement is unlikely to offset the body’s gains or to weigh the CoR down in internal minutiae.  The demographic impacts of enlargement are manageable, the party-group system has shown significant absorptive capacity, and most members from acceding states enter the body with a good sense of the CoR—where it’s been, how it fits into EU policy-making, and how it straddles the line between consultation and representation.    
These suggestions, while hopeful, should not lead us to overestimate the Committee’s power and potential.  This paper supports Warleigh’s suggestion that the Committee is “something of a rising star,” but the questions of how quickly the CoR star is rising and what its ultimate apogee might be remain open.  In the years preceding Maastricht, some advocates dreamed that the CoR would evolve into a third legislative chamber, a co-equal to the Council or, at least, the Parliament.  These dreams have been definitively dashed.  Though the Committee has achieved a stronger profile than humble ECOSOC, its powers are still very circumscribed; the pre-SEA Parliament was strong by comparison.  What is more, sub-national authorities in the EU do not see the CoR as the only (or even, in many cases, the primary) channel of EU influence.  They continue to employ a range of tools—regional offices in Brussels, supranational organizations like the Assembly of European Regions (AER) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), networks generated via cross-border cooperation, regional development bodies geared toward structural funds—to make their voices heard.  This is as true of sub-national authorities from new member states as it is of those from “old” member states.​[27]​  
The last few years have also witnessed the growth of new groups—the network of regions with legislative powers (REGLEG) being the most notable example—that seek to amplify the voices of specific kinds of sub-national authorities.​[28]​  Relations between the CoR and alternative representational organizations have occasionally been tense.  While few signs suggest that their rows will become intractable, those interested in the CoR and its place in the EU cannot ignore alternative venues or sub-national representation.  
The Committee is also significantly handicapped by its low profile amongst the European citizenry.  Few EU citizens know much about the CoR, and even fewer are confident in its usefulness or potential.  This is particularly true, it seems, in the new member states, where Eurobarometer data suggest that the Committee is the least well-known of all EU bodies/institutions.  In one new member state (the Czech Republic), a recent, year-long survey of press and network media outlets turned up zero mentions of the Committee of the Regions!​[29]​ Obviously, a body that is meant to derive legitimacy from its close connection to citizens will have a hard time increasing its power in the face of such public ignorance.  
Finally, the possible effects of debates surrounding the 2007-2013 budgetary framework and the distribution of regional-policy funds cannot be ignored.  Arguments about the distribution of the budget are bound to be heard within the Committee.  It is not clear, however, that these debates will be more injurious to this body than will similar debates that will doubtless rage in other EU institutions.
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